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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S EQUAL
DIVISION RULE

Affirmative action may be the major moral issue of our time. 1
Even though many advocates of equal opportunity reject the
view that favoring certain groups effectively counters racial and
gender-based discrimination, 2 the use and scope of affirmative
action has continued to expand in the past decade.
While the Supreme Court has upheld affirmative action programs in employment and educational settings, 3 there remain
troubling questions regarding their use in our electoral process.
Since 1980 the Democratic Party has required that each state
delegation to its national convention consist of equal numbers of
men and women.• This party law, called the "equal division
rule," raises serious questions as to the political efficacy and constitutionality of pursuing affirmative action goals through manipulation of an integral part of the electoral process.
Part I of this Note traces the history of affirmative action in
the Democratic Party and the events preceding adoption and
implementation of the equal division rule. Part II establishes
that the equal division rule is subject to constitutional review.
1. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1977); Cohen, Why Ra·
cial Preference is Illegal and Immoral, COMMENTARY, June, 1979, at 40.
2. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1, at 40.
3. While the use of quotas has aroused great dissent, the Supreme Court has upheld
the use of quota plans in two instances. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S.-193 (1979) (allowing 50-50 black-white quota for an apprenticeship program in
private employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-15 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding
that the Minority Business Enterprise provisions of the 1977 Public Works Employment
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. III 1979), under which 10% of the Act's funding was
set aside for "minority business enterprises," did not violate the equal protection clause).
But see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (invalidating use of a
quota for admitting minority students at a state medical school, but allowing race to be
considered as a factor in making admissions decisions).
4. DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., FINAL CALL FOR THE 1980 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CON·
VENTION II E (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1980 FINAL CALL].
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Part III presents constitutional and state statutory challenges to
the equal division rule. The Note concludes that use of the equal
division rule "quota" in the delegate selection process is
unconstitutional.
I.

HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

A.

The Use of Goals

The push to increase participation by blacks and other underrepresented groups in the delegate selection process evolved
from the bitter fight over control of the Mississippi delegation to
the 1964 Democratic National Convention. 6 Thereafter, the
Democratic National Committee, in its Call for the 1968 Convention, guaranteed the opportunity to participate in the delegate selection process to all Democrats regardless of race, religion, or ethnicity!'
5. See generally T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964 (1966).
6. 1964 PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 30-31, reprinted in
Segal, Legal Delegate Selection Standards: The Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 873, 877 n.19 (1970).
The mandate of the 1964 Convention created an equal rights committee to study discrimination in the state parties and to work for nondiscrimination. This committee was
the first to propose affirmative action in the delegate selection process of the Democratic
Party. About a year after the committee's report, its chair, Gov. Richard Hughes of New
Jersey, reported in a letter to the state chairs that while the committee had "agreed that
a quota system for delegations is not feasible in practice, it [was] determined to make
certain that all delegations to the (1968 Convention would be) broadly representative of
the Democrats of the State." 26 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1343 (June 7, 1968); see also
Tabach-bank & Kelly, Reform of the Delegate Selection Process to Democratic National
Conventions: 1964 to the Present, 7 S.W.U. L. REv. 273, 276 (1975) (tracing delegate
selection reform through the various reform·commissions).
The six "basic points" which the Hughes Committee established as minimal standards
for equal participation in party affairs were:
1. All public meetings at all levels of the Democratic Party in each State
should be open to all members of the Democratic Party regardless of race, color,
creed or national origin.
2. No test for membership in, nor any oaths of loyalty to, the Democratic
Party in any State should be required or used which has the effect of requiring
prospective members of the Democratic Party to acquiesce in, condone or support discrimination on the grounds of race, color, creed or national origin.
3. The time and place for all public meetings of the Democratic Party on all
levels should be publicized fully and in such a manner as to assure timely notice
to all interested persons. Such meetings must be held in places accessible to all
Party members and large enough to accommodate all interested persons.
4. The Democratic Party, on all levels, should support the broadest possible
registration without discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or national
origin.
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In 1969 the Democratic National Committee established the
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection7 ("the
McGovern-Fraser Commission") to implement this mandate.
The McGovern-Fraser Commission found that the party discriminated against blacks, women, and members under the age
of thirty. 8 The Commission urged greater involvement by these
groups in the delegate selection process.9
5. The Democratic Party in each State should publicize fully and in such
manner as to assure notice to all interested parties a full description of the leglll
and practical procedures involved . . . should be done in such fashion that all
prospective and current members of each State Democratic Party will be fully
and adequately informed of the pertinent procedures in time to participate in
each selection procedure at all levels of the Democratic Party organization.
6. The Democratic Party in each State should publicize fully and in such
manner as to assure notice to all interested parties a complete description of
legal and practical qualifications for all officers and representatives of the State
Democratic Party. Such publication should be done in timely fashion so that all
prospective candidates or applicants for any elected or appointed position within
each State Democratic Party will have full and adequate opportunity to compete
for office.
26 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1344 (June 7, 1968).
Failure to comply with these requirements could lead to refusal to seat the invalidly
selected delegates. Id. at 1343. The Democratic National Committee accepted this
recommendation when it adopted the 1968 CALL FOR THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION.
7. The 1968 Convention established this Commission with former Senator George
McGovern, the Party's 1972 presidential nominee, and subsequently Donald Fraser, then
a Congressman from Minnesota and later the mayor of Minneapolis, as its chair. See
Tabach-bank & Kelly, supra note 6, at 280.
8. DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., MANDATE FOR REFORM, A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE SELECTION (1970), reprinted in 117 CONG. REc.
32908, 32913 (Sept. 22, 1971), (hereinafter cited as MANDATE FOR REFORM].
BLACKS AND WOMEN

AS A

PERCENTAGE or NATIONAL CONVENTION DELEGATES

Year

Percent Black

Percent Women

1952
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980

1.5
2
5
15
11

12.5
13
13
40
33

14

49

J. CEASER, REFORMING THE REFORMS 52 (1982).
9. Id. While the McGovern-Fraser Commission lacked direct enforcement power, the
guidelines were treated as party law because of the Commission's status as agent of the
1968 Convention and also its close collaboration with the 1972 Credentials Committee.
See Note, Adjudicating National Convention Delegation Disputes: Prospects for the
Development of Democratic Party Law, 7 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 374, 376 (1976). The Credentials Committee, with the power to establish rules governing the seating of delegates,
made the guidelines obligatory and imposed sanctions on deficient delegations, including
refusal to seat them. See Vining, Delegate Selection Reform and the Extension of Law
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For the 1976 convention, the national party required each
state party to adopt an affirmative action plan for the delegate
selection process. 10 These plans were designed to set forth steps
which the state party would take· to promote greater participation by blacks, Hispanics, women, and young Democrats. No
quotas were involved. 11 In 1978, however, the party decided that
encouragement of participation and equal opportunity were not
enough and that equality of result must be guaranteed through
enactment of the equal division rule.

B.

The Use of Quotas

Although proponents of the equal division requirement failed
at the 1976 Democratic National Convention,11 they eventually
succeeded in 1980:18 the Final Call for the 1980 Democratic Nainto Politics, 60 VA. L. REv. 1389 (1974) (describing several credential challenges at the
1972 Convention). Fifty-nine Illinois delegates were unseated in 1972 after the Credentials Committee and the party as a whole meeting in convention ruled that the Illinois
delegates had failed to comply with certain party rules.
In 1972 the Democratic Conventioneers created a new Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure ("the Mikulski Commission") to further the cause of openness
in party affairs and to "take affirmative action to achieve full participation of minorities,
youth and women in the delegate selection process . . . . " COMM'N ON DELEGATE SELECTION AND PARTY STRUCTURE, DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., DEMOCRATS Au.: A REPORT OP
THE COMMISSION ON DELEGATE SELECTION AND PARTY STRUCTURE 21-23 (1973). See also
Abzug, Segal & Kelber, Women in the Democratic Party: A Review of Affirmative Action, 6 CoLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 3 (1974). The Mikulski Commission rejected the use of
quotas in implementing this mandate.
10. DEMOCRATIC NAT'L. COMM., THE CALL FOR THE 1976 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CON·
VBNTION rule 8(a) (1975); see DEMOCRATIC NAT'L. CoMM., NATIONAL RULES FOR DELEGATE
SELECTION (1974) (covering the 1976 national convention) [hereinafter cited as 1976
RULES FOR DELEGATE SELECTION].
11. Also in 1976, each presidential candidate was given the power to review the delegates selected in the caucuses and reject all or part of each, delegation. See 1976 RULES
FOR DELEGATE SELECTION, supra note 10, at rule 10. This device was used to balance the
delegations by race and sex to avoid later affirmative action challenges to delegates
pledged to a particular candidate. See COMM. ON CREDENTIALS, 1976 DEMOCRATIC NAT'L
CONVENTION, DEMOCRACY IN ACTION: THE REPORT OP THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE TO THE
1976 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION Foreword (1976). This practice proved unpopular, however, and was not used during the delegate selection process in 1980.
12. The national convention adopted the Rules Committee's recommendation that
the Democratic Party Charter provide for promotion of equal division, but not require it.
The minority report, requiring equal division of all delegations, was rejected. See Report
of the 1976 Committee on Rules, 18 JOURNAL OP PROCEEDINGS OP THE DEMOCRATIC NAT'L
CONVENTION 3, 16, 24.
13. Although rule 6(A)(2) disallowed the "imposition of mandatory quotas at any
level of the delegate selection process," rule 6(c) allowed the equal division requirement
with a specific exception: "notwithstanding Subparagraph A(2) above, equal division at
any level of delegate or committee positions between delegate men and delegate women
or committeemen and committeewomen shall not constitute a violation of any provision
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tional Convention "require[d] that State Delegate Plans provide
for equal division between Delegate men and Delegate women
and Alternate men and Alternate women in the Convention Delegation."14 Thus, the Democratic Party now requires equal numerical representation of males and females in every delegation
to the Democratic National Convention. Despite the party's past
history of discrimination against women, the wisdom of adopting
a gender-based quota to achieve equal division is questionable.
The use of quotas for affirmative action assumes the inadequacy of equal opportunity; thus, equality of result must be
achieved even though some reverse discrimination might occur.
The use of quotas may indeed make sense in an educational setting;111 but the idea that any political party - a voluntary organization to which individuals adhere because of their common
views on major issues - must distribute power equally among
certain groups in proportion to their voting strength is one that
thereof." DEMOCRATIC NAT'L. COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION RULES FOR THE 1980 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1980 DELEGATE SELECTION
RULES].
14. 1980 FINAL CALL, supra note 4. To implement the equal division rule, the Democratic National Committee proposed four alternative methods. The first method, used at
the caucus level, has men and women elected separately and slated alternately according
to sex. Thus, if a congressional district is allotted four delegates there will be two women
and two men on the slate.
The second alternative is used at post-primary delegate selection caucuses. The state
party must predetermine the sex of each delegate slot. After the presidential primary has
allotted delegates by candidate, the caucus elects males or females following the state
plan.
The third alternative places enforcement of the equal division rule squarely in the
hands of state government officials. Under this scheme, candidates are grouped on the
ballot by sex and presidential preference, and voters are instructed to vote for an equal
number of men and women.
The final method is designed for use in a caucus-convention system as used in Iowa
and Minnesota. At the caucus level, all Democrats, regardless of presidential preference,
elect representatives to the district or state convention. The presidential candidate with
the most supporters at the caucus will have the best chance of having supporters picked
to proceed to the district or state convention at which delegates to the national convention are selected. Under this alternative, males and females are elected separately at each
step and are not allowed to compete against each other except when only one delegate
may go to the next highest level. Democratic Nat'! Comm., Suggested Methods for
Achieving Equal Division at the Level of Publicly Elected Delegates (n.d.) (unpublished
paper on file with the Journal of Law Reform). Thus, the system of delegate selection
used in the state indicates the method used by an individual state party to achieve equal
division. See generally 1980 DEMOCRATIC NAT'L. CONVENTION CoMM., THE DEMOCRATS
1980 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 80-93 (1980) (describing method of selection
used by each state for 1980 convention); see also J. CEASER, supra note 8 at 34-35 (1982).
But the composition of the delegation is intended to reflect the state primary results. See
1980 DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 13.
15. See Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 21, 33-68 (1979).
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threatens that party's vitality and unity. 18
The use of quotas conflicts with the voluntary nature of membership in our political parties. No one is forced to adhere to any
party; rather, party allegiance ideally is based upon a shared desire to work toward the accomplishment of common goals. In
such a voluntary organization party loyalty should cross all categories of gender, age, or race. Indeed, unity compels the association to ameliorate differences of opinion based on these
characteristics.
While the underlying goal of the equal division rule is praiseworthy, the use of quotas denies the existence of party solidarity. The alleged need for equal division presupposes that women
must be represented proportionately lest the views of women be
inadequately expressed. This supposition further assumes that
men cannot represent women and vice versa - a view with
troublesome implications for our entire representative democracy. But women do not hold the same views on every issue. It is
absurd to assume that a female member of the Stop ERA movement can better represent a female member of the National Organization for Women solely because they share a common sex.1 7
Furthermore, if party members are not loyal enough to represent
the best interests of all Democrats, but rather are only able to
represent members of their own group, then it is inconsistent to
protect only women with a quota. The use of quotas should be
extended to blacks, Hispanics, and young people. 18 Such forced
party disjunction could fatally divide an already fragmented
organization.
16. Of course, exposure to differing views and new ideas is essential for a political
body, lest it atrophy on a diet of old views that have lost their force and relevance. The
members of political parties, however, join voluntarily. To keep the party united, consensus is essential. The party, therefore, must work to find a consensus among its members
instead of employing methods which tend to balkanize rather than unite.
17. Voluntary identification with the Democratic Party overrides most sexist political
proclivites in both men and women. A timely example is support of the Equal Rights
Amendment ("ERA"), the proposed twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution. Assuming arguendo that being anti-ERA is sexist and being pro-ERA is not sexist, a view
many would not share, identifying oneself with the Democratic Party, which actively
supports the ERA, creates a rebuttable presumption that the individual Democrat is
pro-ERA regardless of his or her gender.
18. Indeed, it is hard to understand why only women have been singled out for quota
preference. Both the McGovern-Fraser Commission, see MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra
note 8, at 44-46, and the Mikulski Commission, see Abzug, Segal & Kelber, supra note 9,
at 19, recognized the need for affirmative action in the party for members of racial minorities and young people as well as women. It has been proposed that black and other
minority groups be guaranteed proportionate representation in all elective and appointive bodies of our government. See Bell, Reagan and Blacks' Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov.
25, 1980, at A19, col. 1.
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The equal division rule's divisiveness stems partially from the
fact that delegates cannot be elected simply because they are
active and loyal Democrats; instead, the factor of gender, which
is irrelevant to party loyalty or fervor, must be taken into account. Regardless of qualifications, a delegate candidate may be
denied participation simply because fifty percent of the delegates already on the slate are of the opposite gender. Thus, a
gender-based rift is created, with two classes of Democrats, with
gender being a significant factor in determining what opportunities each individual will enjoy in party affairs. 19
Despite these arguments against the equal division rule, the
party has chosen to require equal division at all future conventions. In light of this fait accompli, the following sections address the question of whether the rule is judicially reviewable
and, if so, whether it is constitutional.

II.

THE REVIEWABILITY OF THE EQUAL DIVISION RULE

A.

State Action

The personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution are enforceable only against governmental infringement;ll0 the Constitution does not regulate the private affairs of individuals. ll 1 A
court has no jurisdiction, therefore, to hear the merits of a constitutional claim unless the activity in question represents state
19. From a broader perspective, the concept of mandatory division of a political body
is one that bodes ill for the basic concept of a representative democracy. If there must be
equal division of a party convention, perhaps equal division should be required in Congress as well. At some point voters must be trusted to elect those persons whom they feel
can best represent them, regardless of gender. To assume that elected officials are able to
represent only their own interest groups is to refute the concept of representative democracy. Equal division is illogical and ill-considered in any setting involving representation.
20. See generally Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221; Note, State Action:
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 CoLUM. L.
REV. 656 (1974).

Arguably, the problem of distinguishing "state" and "private" action is one of balancing constitutional interests against the interests of private persons. See, e.g., Black, The
Supreme Court 1966 Term-Foreward: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 100-03 (1967); Henkin, Shelly v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962); Williams, The Twilight of
State Action, 41 TEx. L. REV. 347, 378 (1963).
21. The sole exception is the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of slavery, which
encompasses both governmental and private action. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).

316

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:2

action. 22 Despite recent decisions evincing a desire to i'estrict the
scope of the state action concept,23 there is ample precedent
supporting the view that implementation of the equal division
rule constitutes state action.
In the White Primary Cases, H the Supreme Court recognized
that a political party's conduct may be subject to constitutional
scrutiny. The White Primary Cases involved efforts by political
parties to prevent blacks from voting in primary elections. In
United States v. Classic, 211 the Court held that "where state law
has made the primary an integral part of [the electoral process]"
a state political primary must be held to the same constitutional
standards as the general election}il9 In Smith v. Allwright,27 the
state had delegated to the party authority to establish voter
qualifications. In striking down a party rule prohibiting blacks
from voting in a state-regulated party primary, the Court held
that such a delegation of authority made the party's actions
those of the state. 28
A finding of direct state regulation of party conduct, though,
does not seem crucial to the state action determination. In Terry
v. Adams, 29 the Jaybird Democratic Association excluded blacks
from voting in its "pre-primary" elections. For over sixty years
the winner of this "pre-primary" had gone on to win the regular
Democratic Party primary and the general election in the overwhelmingly Democratic Texas county. 30 Unlike the situations in
22. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18 (1978). For a discussion of the state action question as it applies to the activities of political parties, see
Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Political Parties in the Wake of
Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 TEx. L. REV. 935, 950-60 (1975); Chambers & Rotunda, Reform of
Presidential Nominating Conventions, 56 VA. L. REV. 179, 194-95 (1970).
23. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (conduct of privately owned electric utility found not to constitute state action, because the utility was
insufficiently tied to the government and provision of electric service is not an activity
traditionally reserved to state authority or commonly associated with state sovereignty);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private social club might be free to
discriminate racially in its membership because its activities are not sufficiently tied to
government to bring it within the Constitution). But cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (privately owned restaurant occupying the street side of a city
parking lot which holds itself open to the public has a close enough relationship with the
government to bring it within the equal protection clause).
24. E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.s: 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
25. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
26. Id. at 318.
27. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
28. Id. at 664-65.
29. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
30. Id. at 465-66.
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Classic and Smith, the state neither regulated nor afforded special recognition to the party activity in question. The Court
found, however, that the absence of state regulation of party
elections constituted a delegation of the state's authority to the
party, establishing state action. 31 The Court held the state in violation of the fifteenth amendment for merely permitting the
Jaybirds to conduct a racially discriminatory primary within its
borders. 32
The logic of the White Primary Cases dictates a finding of
state action with respect to the equal division rule. The theme
that runs throughout these cases is that the electoral process is a
public function, and any "integral part" of that process is thus
state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. 33 For purposes of
determining state action, the particular form of the nominating
process - primary, caucus, or state convention - has no legal
significance; assuming the conduct of the general election is
state action,3" any integral part of that election must also constitute state action. 811
As a practical matter, a court should have little difficulty finding state action in the implementation of the equal division rule.
Both the Democratic and Republican Parties are linked to the
government in many ways. These links include pervasive regulation of party selection procedures in nearly every state,38 automatic ballot access in every state, 37 federal campaign financing
of Democratic and Republican presidential nominees,38 and
31. Id. at 469.
32. Id.
33. Rotunda, supra note 22, at 952. But see Comment, One Man, One Vote and the
Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 536, 545
(1970) ("It would be a distortion of common understanding to call delegates state governmental officials.").
34. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1977) (dictum) ("While the Constitution protects private rights of association and advocacy with regard to the election of
public officials, our cases make it clear that the conduct of the elections themselves is an
exclusively public function.") (citing White Primary Cases, discussed supra notes 24-32
and accompanying text); see also Pollack, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity:
A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1959) ("Only a state can conduct elections - especially so where the state is one in which, under the Constitution, a
republican form of government is perpetually guaranteed.").
35. See Seergy v. Kings County Rep. County Comm., 459 F.2d 308, 313 (2d Cir.
1972); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370, 373 (3d Cir. 1965) (dictum); Bentrnan v. Seventh Ward Dern. Exec. Comm., 421 Pa. 188, 218 A.2d 261 (1966); Wagner v. Gray, 74 So.
2d 89 (Fla. 1954); Rotunda, supra note 22, at 955; see also United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 318 (1941) (constitutional safeguards apply to primary elections where "state
law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure or choice").
36. See Chambers & Rotunda, supra note 22, at 195.
37. Cf. Note, supra note 9, at 387.
38. 16 u.s.c. § 9012(0 (1976).
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state funding of Democratic and Republican primaries. 39 Furthermore, the Court has recognized that nomination by either
the Republican or Democratic Party is an unavoidable prerequisite for election to most major elective offices in the nation. ' 0
These "ties that bind" inject state action arguably into almost
any official action of either major party, and certainly into those
official actions directly related to the electoral process. Nothing
in recent Supreme Court decisions indicates a retreat from the
principles set forth in the White Primary Cases. 41 Because it affects an integral part of the electoral process, the equal division
rule is state action subject to constitutional scrutiny.

B. Justiciability: Application of the Political Question
Doctrine
To be subject to the constitutional review, the party's adoption of the equal division rule must not only constitute state action; challenges to the rule must raise justiciable questions. The
political question doctrine holds that certain matters are better
resolved by the political process than by judicial review.• 2 Internal party rules governing the selection of delegates to a political
39. In 1980 there were 36 state presidential primaries. Wicker, Reforming the Reforms, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, at 27, col. 5.
40. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975).
41. The Court has avoided the state action issue in each of the most important recent
cases. See Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S.
107, 121 (1981) (review limited to whether Wisconsin law could override party rules);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (credentials challenge of delegates disposed of
without reference to state action requirement; no claim that party rules violated the
Constitution); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 n.4 (1972) (circuit court's finding of state
action not questioned on appeal); see also Rotunda, supra note 22, at 943-51.
42. See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). In Baker the Court held that a reapportionment case is nonjusticiable if brought
under the guaranty clause, but can be judicially reviewed if brought under the equal
protection clause. The Baker Court stated that "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the states, which gives rise to the 'political question,'" 369 U.S. at
210. The Court would refuse to decide a case if there were present any one of these
elements: (1) a clear ("textually demonstrable") constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department, (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it, (3) the impoasibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion, (4) the impossibility of a court's
deciding the issue without evincing a lack of respect for the political branch, (5) a peculiar need to adhere without question to the decision already made by the political body,
or (6) the possibility of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. Id. at 217. The Court decided that since the reasons for
nonjusticiability have "nothing to do with their touching on matters of state governmental organization," id. at 218, a court could decide a reapportionment case when based on
the equal protection clause. Id. at 237.
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convention could be characterized as matters best resolved by
the political party itself.' 3 The Supreme Court, though, has not
accepted this rationale. In Terry v. Adams," for example, the
Court upheld a fifteenth amendment challenge to internal party
practices. A constitutional challenge to the equal division rule
is no less justiciable. Two recent Supreme Court cases support
this proposition. Cousins v. Wigoda" and Democratic Party of
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette'8 indicate that the
courts may review constitutional challenges to the national convention nominating process. 47 While these two cases upheld the
supremacy of party law over state regulation, 48 the Court has
never held that party law is immune from constitutional
scrutiny. 49

III.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EQUAL DMSION RULE

The Democratic Party's Right To Associate Freely

The first amendment guarantees individuals the right to
band together, privately, for political, religious, or purely social
benefit. 10 To safeguard this freedom, the Court rarely intrudes
into the decisionmaking process of private organizations. u In recent years the Supreme Court has been reluctant to regulate internal party rules or allow state control over the delegate selection process because such regulation abridges the first
amendment right of free association.H This reluctance, however,
43. See Kester, Constitutional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 U. VA. L. REv.
735, 782-83 (1974); Comment, supra note 33, at 546-47. But see Rot~da, supra note 22,
at 960-62 (arguing that the questions likely to arise in the context of party action are no
more political than those decided by the Court in the right to vote cases).
44. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
45. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
46. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
47. See Rotunda, supra note 22.
48. See supra note 41.
49. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Rotunda, supra note 22.
50. The first amendment reads in part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
... the right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . ." U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
51. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Any interference
with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its
adherents.").
52. See, e.g., Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,
450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). Associational freedom appears to be the primary basis for the decisions in LaFoliette and Cousins. In a footnote,
the LaFollette Court quotes Professor Tribe: "Freedom of association would prove an
empty guarantee if associations could not limit control over their decisions to those who
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has never led to an absolute prohibition on judicial intervention
in party affairs; 118 the Court will balance the right of free association against other affected constitutional rights. For example, in
the White Primary Cases the Court held that the fifteenth
amendment right to vote free from any racial discrimination
outweighed the right of free association. a. The right of free association, therefore, will not shield a pariy from certain constitutional commands.
Absent a finding of invidious racial discrimination,1111 however,
it is unclear which constitutional commands will override a
party's right to free association. The equal division rule may be
attacked as unconstitutional on several grounds: first, because
the equal division rule involves a discrimination based on sex, it
must be able to withstand equal protection scrutiny; second, the
rule tampers with the fundamental right to vote and its corollary, the right to be a candidate; finally, the equal division rule
may conflict with the equal rights provisions found in many
state constitutions.
share the interests and persuasions that underlie the association's being." 450 U.S at 122
n.22 (quoting L. TRIBE, supra note 22, § 13-24, at 791 (1978)) (footnote omitted). Similarly, the Cousins Court stated: "The National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy
a constitutionally protected right of political association." 419 U.S. at 487.
53. The Court has dealt with challenges to the delegate selection rules of the national
Democratic Party in three recent cases: Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975);
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). In Cousins and again in LaFollette, the Court held
(1) that the rules of a national political party override conflicting state law, absent a
compelling state interest, and (2) that any state interest in the selection of delegates to
the Democratic National Convention is inferior to the party's right to determine the
composition of its national convention. Cousins also limited O'Brien; the latter involved
a refusal of the Court to intervene in the "internal determinations of a national political
party ... that are essentially political in nature." 409 U.S. at 4. Notwithstanding the
broader pronouncement of O'Brien, Cousins and LaFollette demonstrate that while the
limits of the rule are unclear, party law generally supersedes state law in the delegate
selection process.
When dealing with the rules of a political party, the Cousins and LaFollette decisions
show the importance the Court attaches to the first and fourteenth amendments' right of
voluntary association. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 487; LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 121. But
"[n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any event." United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973) (involving a constitutional challenge to a federal statute
barring federal employees from taking an active role in politics).
54. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
55. The White Primary Cases were distinguished in O'Brien because the latter was
"not a case in which claims are made that injury arises from invidious discrimination
based on race in a primary contest within a single state. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)." O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 4 n.1 (footnotes
omitted). But it is unlikely that a similar limiting distinction would be made again, because the Cousins Court specifically focused on whether state law should have primacy
over party law in determining the qualifications of delegates to the national convention.
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B. Equal Protection and the Equal Division Rule
1. Equal division and sex discrimination- If the issue
were solely one of sex-based discrimination the equal division
rule would likely pass muster. Gender-based classifications are
currently afforded an intermediate degree of judicial scrutiny,"
and are upheld provided they "serve important governmental
objectives and [are] substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives. " 117
The goal of the equal division rule is to increase female participation in the nominating process - an undoubtedly important
objective118 given the history of underrepresentation of women in
party affairs. 119 Furthermore, there is clearly a substantial relation between the rule and the achievement of the stated objec56. See, e.g., Orr v. On, 440 U.S. 268 ,(1979) (involving a challenge to the Alabama
alimony statutes); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a provision of the
Social Security Act which allowed women to compute their benefits more favorably than
men); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma law permitting the
sale of 3.2% alcoholic-content beer to women at age 18 and to men at age 21); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down an Oregon statute which preferred men to women as administrators of an intestate estate).
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
58. It is, of course, possible to argue that the objective of equal division is itself illegitimate. It could be said that elected delegates are to represent the interests of all their
constituents; that the notion that only women delegates can sufficiently represent female
Democrats is inherently sexist and threatens our concept of representative democracy.
See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
Justice Douglas's dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), posited a similar argument. In DeFunis, a white male applicant challenged the University of Washington Law School's affirmative action admissions program on the grounds that he had been
denied admission in favor of persons with lower quantitative credentials (grade-point
average and score on the Law School Admission Test) solely because of his race. The
Court vacated the case, deciding that since the petitioner was due to graduate law school
that year regardless of the outcome of the case, the issue was moot. Justice Douglas
dissented from the finding of mootness and strongly argued against the program. Douglas wrote: "The purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce black
lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for
Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for Americans ... ."Id.at 342 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
An analogous argument against the equal division rule can be culled from Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (finding an unconstitutional dilution of the right to vote due
to a malapportionment of Georgia's congressional seats). "Wesberry," the Court later
stated, "clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative government
in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a state." Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964) (emphasis added). Adding the factor of sex to the
principle of representative government, which the equal division rule does, appears to
run counter to the Court's own reading of its decision in Wesberry.
59. See Abzug, Segal & Kelber, supra note 9 (discussing the use of affirmative action
to increase the power and representation of women in the Democratic Party).
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tive: the rule inevitably achieves the goal of equalizing the munher of men and women delegates.
2. Equal division as affirmative action- The equal divison
rule is fashioned as an affirmative action program. This characterization could result in an entirely different type of judicial
review. 60 In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 61 the Court rejected an
equal protection challenge to the Minority Business Enterprise
("MBE") provision of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, which provided that ten percent of all federal funds for
local public works projects be used to procure services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members.81 Chief
Justice Burger appears to have melded the strict scrutiny test
and the more lenient test advanced by Justice Brennan in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 83 Burger's analysis provides insight into a possible standard of review of equal
division if challenged solely on equal protection grounds.
Chief Justice Burger's Fullilov~ test has two components: (1)
whether the objectives of the legislation are within the power of
Congress;IM and (2) if within that power, whether the classification in this context is a constitutionally permissible means
for achieving the objective - a means not violative of equal
protection. 811
60. Compare, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state anti-miscegenation
statute subjected to strict scrutiny), with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(federal affirmative action statute not subject to strict scrutiny).
61. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. III 1979). The definitions used to identify minority
group members are set forth in the appendix to Chief Justice Burger's opinion, 448 U.S.
at 494-95.
In Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an
opinion which was joined by Justices White and Powell: Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment that the 10% set-aside program
was constitutional on its face. Marshall's opinion succinctly stated that discriminatory
classifications providing benefits to minorities - programs labelled affirmative action "lack the 'traditional indicia of suspectness' " and therefore "should not be subjected to
conventional 'strict scrutiny'." 448 U.S. at 518-19 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 437 U.S. 265, 357, 362 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. 437 U.S. 265, 324 (1978).
64. 448 U.S. at 473.
65. Id. In light of Chief Justice Burger's "power-means" analysis in Fullilove, if the
power exists, use of a gender-based classification will survive challenge if "substantially
related to an important governmental objective." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). For example, this "substantial relationship" standard could, in light of Fullilove,
be met by a similar statute which grants a percentage set-aside to firms headed by women. The government's objective, to eradicate sexism in government contracting, would
most likely be considered an important one. The method used to realize this objective
would most probably be considered substantially related to the objective. Thus, such a
sex-based quota would pass judicial scrutiny. The power•to discriminate sexually is not
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The first amendment freedom of association clearly gives the
party the power to prescribe delegate selection rules, just as it
has the power to establish procedures to be used at its national
conventions. The White Primary Cases, however, demonstrate
that party rules are subject to judicial scrutiny when they
abridge the right to vote guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment. 66 While affording the party wide latitude in formulating
its delegate selection rules, this power must be policed by the
judiciary to keep it within the confines of the Constitution; obviously the Court will not defer to the party if it is acting outside
the constitutional limits of its power, just as it would not defer
to Congress if it were acting unconstitutionally.
The second question to be answered under Burger's Fullilove
test is whether the discriminatory criterion is a constitutionally
permissible means for achieving the purported objectives. The
means test involves a number of questions depending on the
facts of the case. 67
Applying this analysis to the equal division rule, it could first
be asserted that the equal division rule is an impermissible
"means" of achieving greater opportunities for women because it
is underinclusive. 68 The equal division rule, of course, benefits
only one group that the Democratic Party has identified as
needing affirmative action in the delegate selection proces!J. 89
The underinclusiveness of the rule, however, does not render it
an impermissible means unless it effects "an invidious discrimiwithout restrictions, however. The Court remains suspicious of classifications based on
sex and generally will not uphold them if based solely on "merely rational grounds,"
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,534 (1975), or administrative convenience, Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
66. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
67. In Fullilove, the inquiry centered upon: the amount of deference the judiciary
should show a congressional act; whether Congress can act only in a "color-blind" manner; whether the act was either over or underinclusive in its coverage; and whether it
impermissibly deprives nonminority contractors of access to at least some part of the
work generated under the Act. 448 U.S. at 472-85. ·
68. In Fullilove the petitioner argued that the 10% set-aside provision of the MBE
program was prohibitively underinclusive because it granted preference only to certain
select minority groups while others, both groups and individuals, who could also show a
history of past discrimination, were left unassisted. 448 U.S. at 485-86. Burger rejected
the underinclusive argument because he found no showing of invidious discrimination in
setting up the MBE program. Invidious discrimination could possibly be shown he said,
by proof that an identifiable minority group that has suffered as much or more than the
preferred group was not included in the program. The Chief Justice found it "not inconceivable" that a case could be made out against some limit on MBE eligibility in special
circumstances. Id. at 486.
·
69. With the exception of the equal division rule, the delegate selection rules ban the
use of quotas. 1980 DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 13, rule 6A(2).
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nation."70 Many believe that an "invidious" discrimination can
be distinguished from a "benign" discrimination in that the purpose of an invidious discrimination is to discriminate against
someone or some group in a way that "stigmatizes," rather than
to discriminate in favor of someone or some group. 71 Because the
number of delegate positions is constant, setting aside fifty percent of those positions for one underrepresented group without
giving similar percentage guarantees to other underrepresented
groups reduces the chances for, say, a black male or a Hispanic
male under the age of thirty to be a delegate. Nevertheless, it
can be argued that the rule does not directly discriminate
against anyone, only in favor of women. The rule does not stigmatize males or blacks,72 for example; they are not given a badge
of inferiority by not having their own quota allotment in each
state delegation. Moreover, the party may choose to attack the
vestiges of discrimination on a group-by-group basis rather than
all at once. 78 Accordingly, the party may adopt a rule designed
to remedy only sex discrimination. The rule's limited scope, pro.ducing no invidious discrimination, does not render the equal division rule an impermissible means.
The Court in Fullilove also rejected the assertion that the
MBE program was overinclusive because some minority-owned
businesses eligible for the ten percent set-aside program had not
suffered from past discrimination and, therefore, should not
benefit under the quota plan. 74 An overinclusive discriminatory
classification is unacceptable unless it provides reasonable assurance that its application will be limited to accomplishing its "re70. See 448 U.S. at 486.
71. What is ignored in applying these conclusory labels "benign" and "invidious" is
that there is always a flip side to any discrimination. Racial discrimination against blacks
has helped whites retain their grip on wealth and power in this country. Thus, discrimination against blacks was at the same time an inverse discrimination in favor of whites.
Discrimination in the name of affirmative action may be benign in purpose, but never
completely in effect. To discriminate in favor of one group is necessarily to discriminate
against another group. The terms "invidious" and "benign" are thus to a large degree,
worthless distinctions when speaking of discrimination.
72. The importance of the stigmatizing effect of discrimination as a grounds for invalidation of a statute or regulation is discussed by Justice Brennan in Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 437 U.S. 265, 373-76 (1978).
73.· "[A] legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time'. . . ." Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) (quoting Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608,
610 (1935)). See also Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. Arv.
107, 115 (1976).
74. 448 U.S. at 486. Chief Justice Burger noted that the act eliminated from participation in the program those businesses not "bona fide" within the guidelines. Id. at 48788. Somehow, the Chief Justice found in this requirement sufficient assurance that the
statute would not be overinclusive in its application.
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medial" objectives. 76 Chief Justice Burger found the MBE program provided such "reasonable assurance" because, first, the
misapplication of ethnic and racial criteria is remediable79 and,
second, the MBE program was temporary. 77 In the absence of
either factor, Burger would not have been reasonably assured
that the MBE program would be limited to achieving its remedial objectives.
The equal division rule is overinclusive because it benefits women who would have been elected delegates without the fiftyfifty quota requirement. There have long been female delegates
to the National Conventions. The rule, however, does not give
"reasonable assurance" that it will be limited to its remedial
objectives; and although a gender-based criteria is unlikely to be
misapplied, the rule is not temporary - it is a permanent
fixture of party law. 78 If the set-aside program in Fullilove were
to continue permanently without further congressional approval
or review, the Court would have found the provision impermissibly overinclusive. 79 The permanent status of the equal division
rule likewise renders it invalidly overinclusive.
Thus, even if equal division were challenged solely on equal
protection grounds, the rule could not stand unaltered. Equal
division, however, involves more than sex discrimination in a
context of affirmative action. Equal division forces voters to vote
for an equal number of men and women as delegates; voters are
not free to opt for the candidates of their choice. Consequently,
the vote is encumbered and thus diluted. The equal division requirement, therefore, infringes upon a voter's choice, forcing the
voter to discriminate sexually when marking a ballot. Arguably,
indeed quite probably, such a scheme unconstitutionally
abridges the fundamental right to vote and, concomitantly, the
right to be a candidate.

C.

Equal Division and the Right to Vote

1. The right to be a delegate- Although no constitutional
provision literally ensures the right to be a candidate,80 the
75. Id. at 487.
76. Id. at 489.
77. Id.
78. DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THB UNJTBD
STATES, art. 2, § 4 (n.d.).
79. See 448 U.S. at 489.
80. See Note, Developments in the Law - Elections, 88 HARv. L RBv. 1111, 1217
(1975).
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courts have read the Constitution to provide such a right. 81
Hence, while the state may place reasonable restrictions on ballot access, the restrictions must not violate any general provisions of the Constitution. 81 It is possible, for example, for the
state to impose certain restrictions in order to limit the size of
the ballot,83 or avoid the possibility of fringe candidacies.M In
whatever form, ballot access restrictions must comport with the
dictates of the equal protection clause. 86 Additional constitutionally guaranteed individual rights such as the right to vote and
the right to associate will generally outweigh the state's interest
in regulating the right of candidacy.88
Equal protection requires that a restriction with a "real or appreciable impact" on the right to vote be "closely scrutinized."87
Candidate restrictions must withstand the same level of scrutiny
when they adversely affect voters.88 In examining the constitutionality of the equal division rule, however, additional constitutional rights beyond equal protection are involved. The rule contravenes the nineteenth amendment right to vote free from
abridgement on the basis of sex.
The nineteenth amendment was passed to guarantee women's
suffrage. 89 Its wording, however, makes it equally applicable to
men and women. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he Nineteenth Amendment . . . applies to men and women alike and by
its own force supersedes inconsistent measures.' 090 Therefore,
81. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (Texas's filing fees for candidates
contravenes the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by being so exorbitant as to preclude effectively some persons from running for office).
83. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974) (allowing state to limit the
size of the ballot in order to reduce voter-confusion).
84. See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781-85 (1974) (Texas law allowing
ballot access by four different procedures does not violate the Constitution because some
restrictions are imposed).
85. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 141.
86. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (Ohio's ballot access restrictions invidiously discriminate in violation of the equal protection clause by burdening
the right to associate).
87. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(subjecting minimal poll tax to close scrutiny). But see McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (not subjecting to stringent standard of review incidental
burden on voting right).
88. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
89. The nineteenth amendment reads in part: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
90. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of
a Georgia poll tax applicable only to men as an issue of taxing authority not involving
the nineteenth amendment).
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just as it is unconstitutional to abridge a woman's right to vote,
it is equally unconstitutional to abridge a man's right to vote.
Several state courts, in the years subsequent to the nineteenth
amendment's adoption, relied upon the nineteenth amendment
to hold that a woman could not be denied the right to be a candidate because of her sex. 91
Furthermore, an analogy between the fifteenth and nineteenth
amendments also clearly leads to the conclusion that one cannot
be denied the right to be a candidate on account of sex. The
fifteenth amendment to the Constitution forbids the denial or
abridgement of the right to vote on the basis of race. 92 The
Court has noted the similarity between the fifteenth amendment
and its "sister," the nineteenth, stating that the latter "is in
character and phraseology precisely similar to the Fifteenth
. . . . One cannot be valid and the other invalid. " 93 These two
constitutional addenda stand for the same thing: one proscribes
race discrimination in voting, while the other proscribes sex discrimination in voting. Any law which would' hinder a person's
ability to become a candidate for elective office because of race
is violative of both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 94
It is unconstitutional for states to dictate, promote or facilitate
"a distinction in the treatment of persons solely on the basis of
race. " 911 Thus, for instance, a state may not designate on a ballot
which candidates are black and which are white." Given the
91. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 240 Mass. 601, 135 N.E. 173 (Mass. 1922) (19th
amendment elimination of male-only voting restriction in state constitution also eliminates similar restriction on ability to hold office) (advisory opinion); Opinion of the Justices, 113 A. 614, 617 (Me. 1921) (In opining that females have a right to hold office, the
court noted, "[e]very political distinction based upon the consideration of sex was eliminated [by the 19th amendment]."); Preston v. Roberts, 183 N.C. 62, 110 S.E. 586 (1922)
(19th amendment requires that a woman be allowed to serve as a notary public and clerk
of court); cf. Graves v. Eubank, 205 Ala. 174, 87 S. 587 (1921) (after the 19th amendment
poll taxes must be applied equally to men and women). Contra Breedlove v. Suttles, 302
U.S. 277 (1937) (Georgia poll tax on men only upheld as an issue of taxing authority not
involving the nineteenth amendment).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
93. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922) (upholding the validity of the 19th
amendment).
94. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960). Both cases involved the fixing of voting boundaries in a way which
tended to dilute the voting strength of blacks. Given the degree of racial polarization in
both places, the impairment of voting strength of individual blacks effectively impaired
their ability to be candidates for elective office by making it harder for them to obtain
enough petition signatures to meet filing qualifications.
95. Hamm v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 157 (E.D. Va.), a/f'd.
sub. nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
96. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964). One of the methods which the Democratic National Committee proposed to implement the equal division rule requires the
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precise similarity of the two amendments, the same reasons that
militate against racial discrimination in voting or candidacy
should apply with equal force to sex discrimination in the same
context. 97
Any definition of the word candidate should include candidates for delegate to national political party nominating conventions. Delegate candidates stand for election in primaries; their
names often appear on the ballot. The right to be a candidate
encompasses the right to be a delegate candidate.98 Additionally,
the importance of the national party conventions in the political
scheme lends credence to the assertion that the right to be a
delegate candidate is as important, say, as the right to stand for
election to Congress or a city council. Indeed, in Cousins v.
Wigoda, 99 the Supreme Court stressed "the special function of
delegates," acknowledging that "delegates perform a task of supreme importance to every citizen of the nation regardless of
their state of residence. " 10° Furthermore, many cases evince the
Court's willingness to protect constitutional rights at the primary election level. 101 Thus, the importance the Court places on
the initial stages of the electoral process also points to the need
to safeguard constitutionally based rights associated with the
delegate selection process. Close scrutiny should be applied to
any device which could limit the rights of an individual to be a
delegate candidate.
The equal division rule limits a person's chance to be a delevoter to opt for an equal number of male and female candidates by designating delegate
candidates by sex on the ballot. See supra note 14. This alone may be unconstitutional
under Anderson.
97. It is invalid to suggest that because sex discrimination is given a somewhat lower
level of scrutiny than racial discrimination in a strict equal protection analysis, compare
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (challenge to state alimony statute), with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state anti-miscegenation statute held invalid), the same should
be true in situations involving denial or abridgement of the right to vote. The right to
vote enjoys its own constitutional guarantees over and above equal protection of the
laws. Denial or dilution of the right to vote on the basis of sex is banned to the same
degree to which denial or dilution of the right to vote on the basis of race is banned. The
almost literal similarity between the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments leaves no
room for differing degrees of scrutiny.
98. See Rotunda, supra note 22, at 955-60 (arguing that the constitutional safeguards
applicable to the general election must also apply at any integral part of the electoral
process).
99. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
100. Id. at 490; see Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286 (Pitney, J., dissenting) ("the likelihood of a candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomination
is practically negligible").
101. See, e.g., Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex. rel. LaFollette,
450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134 (1972); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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gate solely on the basis of sex. Prior to adoption of the quota, if
a person ran for delegate from a district with four delegate slots,
for example, he or she had four chances of being elected. Today,
that same person's chances are cut in half, for an individual may
only compete for the two seats allocated to members of his or
her sex. Thus restricted, many people may simply forego standing for election.
If the right to be a candidate means anything, it means the
right to place one's name in contention for a delegate seat. It
means the right not to have that privilege restricted solely because of sex. Equal division says that you cannot run for slots
two and four, you can only run for slots one and three - and
the only reason for this restriction is sex. This limits the right to
be a candidate; indeed it denies one absolutely the right to be a
candidate for one-half of the seats at the national convention.
2. The right to vote- Underlying the right to be a candidate
is the right to vote - a right the Court has termed "a fundamental political right . . . preservative of all rights. " 102 Although
the right to vote is constitutionally protected in state and federal elections, 103 it is not wholly beyond limitation by the states.
A standard of strict scrutiny will be applied to a restriction
where it "has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of
the franchise. " 10' A lesser standard of scrutiny may be used for
certain limitations or incidental burdens, 1011 but strict scrutiny is
the standard of review where a condition is placed on the right
to vote 106 or the strength of the vote is diluted. 107
102. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886)).
103. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554 (1964). In Reynolds, a case involving an Alabama reapportionment scheme, the Court spoke not only of the right to vote but stated: "The
right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic
society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote, just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." Id. at 555.
104. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (New York law barring certain non-taxpayers from voting in school board elections violates the equal protection clause by not furthering any
compelling state interest).
105. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (applying rational
relationship standard to uphold Illinois statute denying prisoner access to absentee
ballot).
106. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
107. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964). Impermissible restrictions include, for example, a state poll tax, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), property ownership, Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), lengthy residency requirements, Dunn v. Blum-
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The right to vote may be unconstitutionally infringed not only
by a law which denies absolutely the right to vote, but also by a
law which limits the right to vote freely for the candidates of
one's choice. In the 1960's the Court was faced with numerous
constitutional challenges to state reapportionment plans based
on the concept that one's vote could be deprived as effectively
by dilution as by outright denial. 108 In Wesberry v. Sanders 10•
the Court recognized "that the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex,
economic status, or place of residence within a State."110
Although the reapportionment cases dealt with legislative
redistricting, the dilution doctrine encompasses a much broader
range of actions. In Gray v. Sanders, 111 the candidate winning
a plurality in a primary election was awarded all of the county's
electoral units - which counted toward nomination by a
majority. The Court found this practice to be unconstitutional
dilution of the minority voters' strength. 111 Even earlier, the
Court struck down practices whereby votes were destroyed by
alteration, 113 diluted by ballot-box stuffing, 114 or simply not
counted. 1111 Despite this broad range of application, the standard
of review has remained consistent and simple - one person's
vote must be counted equally with those of all other voters. 118
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), and lengthy party affiliation, Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51
(1973). But permissible restrictions include reasonable residency and citizenship require•
ments, Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973),
membership in special interest groups, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, 410
U.S. 719 (1973), physical incapacity due to incarceration, McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), and reasonable party affiliation, Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752 (1973).
108. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
see also McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645, 706-10 (1963) (including appendix summarizing reapportionment litigation through 1962).
109. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). In Wesberry, the Court established a test for judging the constitutional validity of congressional districting schemes. The Court required that the
plan achieve substantial equality of population among the various districts established.
Id. at 13-18.
110. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 560-61.
111. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
112. Id. The Court further held that the 15th and 19th amendments forbid diluting
votes on the basis of race or sex. Id. at 379-81.
113. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
114. See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
115. See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
116. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368, 380 (1963).
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There are three reasons why the dilution doctrine should apply to the delegate selection process. First, like their congressional counterparts, convention delegates are directly representative of the people who elect them. Delegates are members of a
deliberative body which not only selects a presidential nominee,
but also debates and adopts a legislative package - the party
platform - which party candidates pledge to support. The
Court has said that "the right to elect legislators in a free and
unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system."117
Thus, since the representative process begins with the selection
of delegates, the right to vote should be no less encumbered
when voting for a slate of delegates than when voting for a legislative representative.
Second, there appears to be little question of the importance
of presidential primaries in the electoral process. 118 As the Supreme Court has recognized, presidential primaries have become
such an integral part of the scheme of electing presidents119 that
"[a]s a practical matter the ultimate choice of the mass of voters
is predetermined when the nominations have been made. " 120 It
would, therefore, seem incongruous to safeguard heavily the
right to vote in a general election but not at the effectively determinative stage - the primary.
Third, although the Supreme Court has never ruled on
whether the dilution doctrine applies to delegate elections for
national party conventions, it has come exceedingly close to doing so. In Gray v. Sanders, 121 the Court applied the dilution
doctrine to a situation where the primary election directly nominated candidates for state offices, but it explicitly reserved judgment where the nomination resulted from a convention. ui Nonetheless, the rationale for Gray applies with equal vigor to the
situation addressed here, and it would be anomalous for the
117. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 562. ("To the extent that a citizen's right to vote
is debased he is that much less a citizen."). Id. at 567.
118. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 489-90.
119. In 1980, voters in 35 state presidential primaries selected 71 % of the delegates
to the Democratic National Convention. Davis, Reforming the Reforms, NEW REPUBLIC,
Feb. 17, 1982, at 8. It would have been impossible to win the Democratic presidential
nomination without the support of most of these delegates. AB the Court has further
recognized, "the likelihood of a candidate succeeding in an election without a party nomination is practically negligible . . . . " Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 490 (citing Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286 (1921) (Pitney, J. dissenting)).
120. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 490.
121. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
122. Id. at 378 n.10. This question was answered explicitly in the affirmative by
Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673, 679 (W.D. Wash.
1970).
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Court to decline to extend it. Additionally, the Court has never
hesitated to protect constitutional rights in the primary election 123 or political party setting. 12• Furthermore, although the
lower courts are split on the issue, most favor extending the dilution doctrine to the delegate selection process. 1211
The objection to the plans under scrutiny in the reapportionment cases was that because they did not accurately apportion
congressional or state legislative seats according to population,
the votes of some people counted for more than the votes of
others. The equal division rule does not weigh the votes of persons participating in the delegate selection process, but it nonetheless dilutes the voting strength of persons by limiting their
choice of candidates. This method has the same effect as gerrymandering legislative districts; both actions limit the right to
vote by limiting its effectiveness and meaning. Both methods toy
impermissibly with the ideal of a representative democracy;
tainted reapportionment does so by violating the one person-one
vote concept, while equal division does so by using sex discrimination in voting to achieve proportionate male/female representation - a goal not countenanced by the Constitution. 126
The equal division rule does not directly impinge upon the
concept of one person-one vote. It does, however, abridge the
more general right to vote on which the concept of one person,
one vote is based. While the lower courts may debate the applicability of the one person, one vote concept to the delegate se123. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
124. See, e.g., Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,
450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
125. Two circuit courts and three district courts have favored the application. See
Redfearn v. Delaware Republican State Comm., 502 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding
that if a state convention were state action, one person, one vote would be required);
Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972) (malapportioned committee districts used in nominating process must be adjusted in accordance with one person, one vote); Doty v. Montana State Democratic Central Comm.,
333 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mont. 1971) (national convention delegates may not be selected
through malapportioned system); Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F.
Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (dilution doctrine applies to convention as well as primary); Smith v. State Exec. Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (equal protection
must be satisfied in selection of delegates). Only two circuit courts have ruled against the
extension, Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) (one person, one vote inapplicable to force allocation of
delegates); Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968) (allocation of delegates will not be forced despite malapportioned state convention system).
126. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). ("The fundamental principle
of fair representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal
numbers of people without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence
within a State").
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lection or nominating process, the basic right to vote clearly does
apply to the primary system, 117 and the dicta on the meaning of
the right to vote found in the reapportionment cases applies
with equal force to the concept of equal division. Specifically,
the right to vote includes "the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice. " 118 Telling a voter that she or he may not
vote for an all-female or all-male slate of delegates (or any unequal admixture thereof) abridges the free choice which is the
keystone of the right to vote. Equal division thus "dilutes" the
right to vote just as would an apportionment scheme which violates the one person, one vote concept.

D.

The Equal Division Rule and Equal Rights

Sixteen states have constitutional provisions which guarantee
equality of rights on the basis of sex. 11• The equal division rule
runs afoul of these provisions, because it creates sex-based restrictions on the right to compete for office. Men and women
may compete only for the slots allocated to their respective gender. Thus, if one hundred men and ten women run for a total of
four delegate seats, each woman would have a twenty percent
chance of gaining a seat, while each man would have but a two
percent chance, because two seats would be reserved for each
gender. This violates the principle of equality of rights, because
similarly situated persons are treated dissimilarly. 180
The Supreme Court's decisions in Democratic Party of the
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette 181 and Cousins v.
127. Id. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
128. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
129. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, §
20; HAWAII CONST. art. I,§ 4; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18; Mn. CONST., Deel. of Rights, art. 46;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. l; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST.
art. I, § 28; TEx. CoNST. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § l; VA. CoNST. art. I, § 11;
WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § l; Wvo. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
These provisions are typically worded: "Equality of rights shall not be abridged or denied on account of ... sex."
130. Cf. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977) (sex of parent cannot be a
factor in allocating child support responsibilities under Maryland equal rights amendment); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974) (husband and wife are both
entitled to recover damages for loss of consortium under Pennsylvania equal rights
amendment). But cf. People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976) (Colorado
equal rights amendment does not prohibit unequal treatment based exclusively on sex in
statutory rape law because physical characteristics unique to one sex situate the parties
dissimilarly).
131. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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Wigoda, 132 made clear the proposition that while political parties are subject to federal constitutional dictates, party law
prevails over state statutes, absent a compelling state interest
which outweighs the party's first amendment right of free association. 133 In searching for such a compelling state interest, state
constitutional provisions might carry greater weight than state
statutory law. Given an important constitutional objective, it is
unclear whether free association would still prevail.
Constitutional provisions evince supreme principles intended
to guide governance of the state. The states could argue that
there is a qualitative difference between the equal rights provision of their state constitutions and the statutes involved in LaFollette and Cousins. Additionally, the constitutional provisions
in question deal with proscribing sex discrimination, a practice
which the Supreme Court has held to trigger automatically
heightened judicial scrutiny. 134
Conversely, the states with equal rights provisions could cite
the fourteenth and nineteenth amendments to the federal constitution as grounds for their having a compelling interest contrary to the equal division rule. The right to associate freely,
which played an important role in LaFollette and Cousins, is
not an absolute right. 1311 When balanced against federal constitutional rights, as manifested by the state equal rights law, it may
be outweighed.
·
CONCLUSION

In adopting a quota to achieve equal gender-based representation at its presidential nominating conventions, the Democratic
Party has carried the concept of affirmative action beyond its
132. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
133. See LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 120-26; Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-91; United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,-567 (1973). Professor Rotunda suggests:
[P]arty rules should control prenomination activities, and the legislature and
courts should abstain from interference (a) if there is no claim that the party
acted unconstitutionally; or (b) if a state statute conflicting with the party rule is
an extraterritorial extension of the state's jurisdiction (that is, if the statute in
question is neither a federal statute regulating national parties nor a state statute regulating state parties) and if the state has no special interest justifying the
burden its extraterritorial statute places on the national party.
Rotunda, supra note 22, at 936.
134. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute
allowing females but not males to buy low-proof beer at age 18).
135. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); cases cited supra note 133.
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constitutional limits. While the rule was not adopted with any
invidious motivation, the notions underlying equal division are
at odds with the idea of a representative democracy. The dubious belief that the sexes must be evenly represented for the
voice of women to be heard adequately is one that cannot carry
the rule in light of its constitutional infirmities. Equal division
involves the Democratic Party in sex discrimination; it dilutes
the right to vote freely, and it restricts the right tQ be a candidate. Finally, many states have an interest in banning discrimination based solely on sex - an interest compelling enough to
overcome the limits on state restrictions of party affairs enunciated in Cousins and LaFollette.
For over ten years the Democratic Party has worked in good
faith to make itself a more open party. The goal of unhindered
accessibility for all individuals who wish to participate in the
delegate selection process suffers from no legal difficulties. Yet
the Democratic Party is tied to the government in many ways
and derives substantial benefits from the government due to its
preferred status as one of our nation's two major parties. As
such, the party's role in the electoral process is subject to constitutional scrutiny. Equal division constitutes a form of sex discrimination which impinges upon fundamental constitutional
rights. It should be discarded voluntarily, 136 before it is struck
down.
·

-Timothy J. Hoy

136. A new party reform commission, named after its chairman, Governor Hunt of
North Carolina, once again subjected the Democratic Party delegate selection rules and
presidential nominating process to review after the 1980 election. For a brief review of
the Hunt Commission's proposals, see Davis, supra note 119. The Democratic National
Committee, recently adopted the Hunt Commission's proposals and, therefore, the equal
division rule remains intact. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 4 (midw. ed.).

